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4) Cloud Account Exploitation

            To enable cross-device use, many ecosystems optionally sync passkeys via cloud. If an attacker takes
            over that cloud account (weak recovery, SIM swap, social engineering), they may gain leverage over
            synced authenticators.

            Mitigate: require strong, phishing-resistant MFA on the user’s Apple/Google/Microsoft accounts; restrict
            or opt out of cloud sync for high-risk roles; scrutinize account-recovery changes.

            5) Phishable Backups & Recovery

            The weakest link is often a “convenience” fallback—SMS codes, email links, or helpdesk resets used
            when a user lacks their device. Attackers simply pivot to those flows, defeating the point of passkeys.

            Mitigate: make every path (enrollment, recovery, device replacement, new-device sign-in) as phishing-
            resistant as the primary. Require supervisor/ID proofing for resets, enforce out-of-band confirmations,
            and disable SMS/email for privileged accounts.

            6) Social Engineering & Coercion


            No password doesn’t mean no people. Attackers still push users to approve prompts, scan rogue QR
            codes, or enroll attacker-owned keys. In some cases, they add their own authenticator post-compromise
            to maintain persistence.

            Mitigate:  user  education;  approval  fatigue  protections;  out-of-band  verification  for  new  authenticator
            enrollment; and alerts on enrollment events—especially for admins.



            Passwordless vs. Phishing-Resistant: Know the Difference

               •  Passwordless = no memorized password (could be biometrics, magic links, OTPs, passkeys).

               •  Phishing-resistant = the method does not expose a reusable secret and won’t authenticate the
                   wrong origin (e.g., FIDO2/WebAuthn passkeys, smart cards, certificate-based auth).

            Some passwordless methods (SMS, email links, OTPs) are not phishing-resistant. They may be useful
            transitional tools, but they’re not end-state security. Aim for passkeys where feasible, and ensure all
            auxiliary flows meet the same bar.



            Field Lessons (What Real Programs Learn)

               •  Biometrics  need  hardening  and  patch  discipline.  Research  keeps  finding  edge  cases;
                   vendors patch; you must stay current.

               •  Cross-device flows can be abused if users aren’t trained to recognize legitimate prompts/QRs.
                   Proximity checks and trusted out-of-band confirmations help.





            Cyber Defense eMagazine – September 2025 Edition                                                                                                                                                                                                          245
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